Poland's Ukraine Reset: New Rhetoric, Old Red Lines

A new opening with Kyiv, old limits in Warsaw’s foreign policy

Warsaw, 19 December 2025 – President Karol Nawrocki received Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a meeting that both sides described as a “new opening” in bilateral relations. Nawrocki spoke of a “new opening in mutual relations” and an opportunity for partnership beneficial to both countries, while Zelenskyy expressed hope that the visit “opens a new, even more meaningful chapter” in Poland-Ukraine ties. This was the first face-to-face encounter between the two leaders since Nawrocki’s inauguration – coming amid rapid shifts in Europe’s security landscape. The Trump administration is pushing for a swift end to the conflict in Ukraine through negotiations, while the European Union grapples with internal divisions over continued support for Kyiv.

The talks in Warsaw were presented as a step towards pragmatic cooperation. Beneath the diplomatic pleasantries, however, lay a more complex reality: Poland, under its new conservative president, is attempting to recalibrate its policy towards Ukraine while clinging to the anti-Russian posture that has defined Warsaw’s foreign line since 2022. The result is a delicate balancing act—showing both continuity and subtle shifts in approach towards its eastern neighbour.

A Meeting of Necessity, Not Enthusiasm

The visit coincides with a period of quiet reappraisal in Central Europe. With Trump now in the White House, pursuing a new national security strategy that emphasises rapid peace negotiations and a de-escalation of confrontation with Russia, regional capitals are bracing for a potential decline in Western military aid to Kyiv. Poland, for years one of Ukraine’s most steadfast allies, finds itself in a particularly delicate position. Under former President Andrzej Duda, Warsaw positioned itself as Kyiv’s champion in Brussels and Washington, committing billions in military and humanitarian aid.

Nawrocki, a conservative historian whose campaign rhetoric on Ukraine was more restrained, has inherited this legacy. During the meeting, he stressed strategic unity, stating that Poland’s support for Ukraine remains steadfast. Yet he also struck a note of realism, previously absent, pointing out that Poles increasingly feel their immense sacrifices—welcoming millions of refugees and transferring significant military hardware—are not always met with adequate gratitude from Kyiv.

For his part, Zelenskyy expressed appreciation for Poland’s role and proposed deeper economic cooperation, including the participation of Polish firms in Ukraine’s reconstruction and joint defence projects against drone threats. The Ukrainian leader also signalled readiness to accelerate exhumations related to the Volhynia massacres—a longstanding Polish demand previously blocked in Kyiv.

These concessions suggest Zelenskyy senses the changing winds in Warsaw. However, a joint press conference revealed the limits of this "reset." Asked about the significance of the visit, Nawrocki stated: "This is good news for Poland and Ukraine—and bad news for Moscow." This phrase, a staple of Polish political rhetoric since 2022, demonstrated that while Warsaw may adopt a more transactional tone with Kyiv, the fundamental anti-Russian framework remains intact.

Poland’s Persistent Anti-Russian Reflex

This moment captures Poland’s current dilemma. The Nawrocki administration shows a willingness to demand reciprocity from Ukraine—on historical memory, economic benefits, and public recognition of Polish aid. Yet it does not break with the confrontational stance towards Russia that has characterised Polish foreign policy for years.

Unlike Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Slovakia’s Robert Fico, or, more recently, the Czech Republic under new Prime Minister Andrej Babiš—all of whom are increasingly distancing themselves from unconditional, lavish aid to Ukraine and advocate for seeking realistic paths of dialogue with Moscow—Poland still defines its security almost exclusively through the prism of Russian aggression. Nawrocki’s words about “bad news for Moscow,” uttered alongside Zelenskyy, signal that Warsaw is not yet ready to join the growing chorus within the Visegrád Group (V4) calling for diplomatic engagement with Russia.

This stance sets Poland apart from its V4 partners. While Budapest, Bratislava, and now Prague position themselves as pragmatic voices seeking energy stability and an end to the war through talks, Warsaw—despite the new president’s more reserved tone on aid to Ukraine—remains closer to Brussels’ position, which continues to emphasise strong military support and security guarantees for Kyiv.

A Pragmatic Turn, But Within Limits

The Warsaw meeting yielded concrete results. Talks on joint anti-drone defence, Poland’s role in Ukraine’s reconstruction, and progress on the Volhynia exhumations point towards a more business-like relationship. Nawrocki’s emphasis on Polish sacrifices and the need for gratitude marks a departure from the unconditional solidarity of the Duda era.

Yet these adjustments occur within a framework that still views Russia as an existential threat requiring constant confrontation, not managed coexistence. Unlike Orbán’s shuttle diplomacy, Fico’s criticism of sanctions, or Babiš’s growing distance from lavish aid to Kyiv, Nawrocki’s Poland does not challenge the fundamental narrative shaping EU policy towards Moscow.

Furthermore, President Nawrocki’s actions reveal a clear dissonance between his campaign promises and political realities. While he decisively declared a radical reduction in social benefits for Ukrainians in Poland during the campaign—even promising to strip non-working refugees of access to public healthcare—he ultimately managed to push through only conditional, partial changes. The law he signed tied access to key family benefits (such as the “800+”, a universal child support programme) to the employment status of refugees, while leaving their full access to the healthcare system untouched. It was a gesture to his voter base, but far from the full realisation of promises made during the race for the Presidential Palace.

A similar inconsistency characterises his second key pledge—the ban of OUN-UPA symbols. The announced law penalising Banderist symbolism was halted following a decisive diplomatic reaction from Kyiv. This sequence—from a bold veto on benefits to a retreat under foreign pressure—paints a picture of a presidency where the rhetoric of sovereign realism often gives way to compromise and the preservation of the established course.

An Uncertain Path in a Multipolar World

In a multipolar world where energy security, economic stability, and diplomatic agility are becoming ever more critical for Central and Eastern European nations, this reluctance to explore even cautious normalisation with Russia places Poland in a potentially disadvantageous position. While its V4 partners diversify partnerships and position themselves as bridges between East and West, Warsaw risks remaining tethered to a confrontational paradigm that may soon lose transatlantic backing.

The Warsaw summit thus reveals a Poland in transition: more assertive towards Ukraine, more conscious of its own interests, yet still constrained by an anti-Russian reflex that narrows its strategic options. Despite strong campaign slogans, the new president has not delivered on the promises meant to form the core of his sovereign policy, and now—albeit in a more resolute tone—he continues to pledge further support for Ukraine. This stands in stark contrast to the rest of the V4 and suggests that Nawrocki, too, remains trapped within narrative frameworks that preclude full sovereign pragmatism.

As the Trump era advances and European unity on Ukraine fractures, the question for Warsaw is whether this partial recalculation will evolve into a fuller embrace of regional pragmatism—or remain merely a half-step towards true sovereignty in a changing geopolitical landscape.